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This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence in US public firms on the 
extent of agency problems related to CEO turnover decisions and on firm valuations after poor 
performance. In particular, we focus on three types of US public firms: family CEO firms, 
professional CEO family firms (family firms managed by a hired CEO outside the founding 
family), and non-family firms. We hypothesize that, the agency problem arising from the 
expropriation of small shareholders by large shareholders in family CEO firms and the agency 
problem arising from the separation of ownership and control in non-family firms, lead to a lower 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, compared to professional CEO family firms. Professional 
CEO family firms are subject to lesser agency problems due to the separation of family 
ownership and management as well as the founding family’s effective monitoring of 
management. The empirical findings are consistent with our prediction. We further hypothesize 
and find that the more severe agency problems in both family CEO firms and non-family firms 
manifest themselves in lower firm value after poor performance, relative to professional CEO 
family firms. Overall, our results indicate that in the CEO turnover setting, family ownership, 
when separated from management, can mitigate agency problems as in professional CEO family 
firm, but when combined with management, can aggravate agency problems as in family CEO 
firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Family firms are prevalent in the US economy, representing 33% of S&P 500 and 48% of 
S&P 1500 firms. As a unique type of public company, a family firm is likely to face different 
types of agency problems from a non-family firm. On one hand, the founding family’s presence 
can reduce the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and management due to 
the family’s active involvement in the firm’s management and/or monitoring. On the other hand, 
it can aggravate the agency problem between large and small shareholders. The founding family, 
being a large and controlling shareholder, may choose to pursue its own interests at the cost of 
other shareholders. Following prior studies (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006), we refer to these 
two types of agency problem as Type I and Type II agency problems, respectively.  
While studies focusing on family firms in East Asian economies (e.g., Faccio, Lang, and 
Young, 2001; Lemmon and Lins 2003) provide consistent evidence that family firms suffer 
severe Type II agency problems, recent studies on US family firms present a different picture. 
They show that, relative to non-family firms, US family firms exhibit higher earnings quality 
(Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan, 2007; Wang, 2005), incur lower cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, 
and Reeb, 2003), and most importantly, command a valuation premium (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). These results seem to suggest that US family firms are subject 
to lesser agency problems than non-family firms. 
Do US family firms indeed suffer lesser agency problems than non-family firms? To better 
understand the agency problems in US family firms, this paper focuses on one key corporate 
decision which can help us to identify the potential agency problems in these firms – the CEO 
retention decision after poor firm performance. As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
poorly performing CEOs who resist being replaced might be the costliest manifestation of agency 
problems. Furthermore, not all family firms are the same with respect to the severity of agency 
problems. We separate family firms that are run by a member of the founding family, i.e., family 
CEO firms, from those run by a hired professional CEO, i.e., professional CEO family firms. 
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While the alleviation of Type I agency problem is more relevant for professional CEO family 
firms, the aggravation of Type II agency problem is more relevant for family CEO firms. Thus, 
we examine the variation of CEO turnover-performance sensitivity across family CEO firms, 
professional CEO family firms, and non-family firms to evaluate the extent of agency problems 
in these firms in the CEO turnover setting. As the ultimate manifestation of agency problems is 
the reduction in firm value, we further investigate how the various agency problems over the 
CEO turnover decision across these three types of firms systematically affect firm value when the 
firm has performed poorly.  
Since the founding family both owns and manages a family CEO firm, its Type I agency 
problem is moderate. However, its Type II agency problem could be severe because the founding 
family might be reluctant to remove its family member from the CEO post when the CEO has 
performed poorly. In contrast, as management and ownership are separated in non-family firms 
and professional CEO family firms, their Type I agency problem could be severe although their 
Type II agency problem is moderate. However, compared to their counterparts in non-family 
firms, the CEOs in professional CEO family firms are under direct monitoring by the founding 
family. Given the founding family’s knowledge of the business, as well as its incentives to 
increase firm value due to its concern with family reputation and a lack of diversification in its 
investment portfolio (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), such monitoring is effective. Hence the Type I 
agency problem in professional CEO family firms is mitigated. Accordingly, we hypothesize that 
the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for both family CEO firms and non-family 
firms than for professional CEO family firms.  
The varying extent of agency problems over the CEO retention decision will ultimately be 
reflected in firm value. Given poor performance, the more severe the agency problem is, the 
smaller the probability that poor performance will lead to a CEO turnover, the more (or longer) 
the firm’s performance will suffer, and consequently the lower the firm value will be. 
Accordingly, we further predict that both family CEO firms and non-family firms are valued 
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lower than professional CEO family firms when the firm has performed poorly, other things 
being equal. 
Using data from 1,145 firms in the S&P 1500 Index (i.e., S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and 
S&P SmallCap 600 indices) over the period 1996–1999, we find that as predicted, the CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for both family CEO firms and non-family firms than 
for professional CEO family firms. When stock returns decrease from the top 25th percentile to 
the bottom 25th percentile, the predicted probability of CEO turnover increases by only 0.1 
percentage points for family CEO firms and 3.6 percentage points for non-family firms but by 
13.7 percentage points for professional CEO family firms. When we further partition family CEO 
firms into founder CEO firms and descendant CEO firms, we find that the turnover-performance 
sensitivity is even lower for descendant CEOs than for founder CEOs. We also find that family 
CEO firms with high family ownership have an even lower turnover-performance sensitivity than 
those with low family ownership, and professional CEO family firms with high family ownership 
have an even higher turnover-performance sensitivity than those with low family ownership, 
suggesting that the impact of family presence increases with family ownership. Our results are 
robust to using alternative performance measures, controlling for additional corporate governance 
variables, and controlling for CEO ownership. We obtain the same inferences when we focus 
only on forced CEO turnovers.  
Following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), we use 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value to test valuation differentials across the three types of firms 
after poor performance. As predicted, we find that after poor performance (i.e., last year’s 
market-adjusted stock returns falling into the bottom quartile of the sample distribution), both 
family CEO firms and non-family firms are valued at a discount relative to professional CEO 
family firms (Tobin’s Q being 0.235 and 0.151 lower), controlling for stock return and other firm 
characteristics that might affect Tobin’s Q. This suggests that the stock market recognizes the 
difficulty in replacing poorly performing CEOs in the former two types of firms and factors it in 
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when valuing the firms. Additional analyses indicate that our results are robust to controlling for 
the potential endogeneity between firm type and firm value and to alternative definition of poor 
performance. 
In addition, while we replicate the well-established family firm valuation premium over 
non-family firms for the full sample, we find that the family firm premium disappears after poor 
performance. The disappearance of the family firm premium is apparently driven by family CEO 
firms, not by professional CEO family firms, which actually enjoy a valuation premium over non-
family firms in such a period, as noted above. Furthermore, when we separate founder CEO firms 
from descendant CEO family firms, we find that even founder CEOs lose their premium while 
descendant CEOs are associated with a large discount in such a period. These are in sharp 
contrast to a large founder CEO premium and an insignificant descendant CEO discount in other 
periods. Thus, agency problems in family CEO firms (both founder CEOs and descendant CEOs) 
result in a reduction in their firm value.    
This paper contributes to the family firm literature by providing insights and evidence on 
the type and extent of agency problems faced by US family firms. By focusing on the CEO 
retention decision and firm value after poor performance, we are able to identify the potential 
agency problem, or the lack of it, in family firms. Both our CEO turnover and valuation results 
show that, while the founding family’s presence effectively lessens the agency problem for 
professional CEO family firms, it certainly aggravates the agency problem in family CEO firms. 
While extant studies find that family firms on average command a valuation premium over non-
family firms, we show that family CEO firms (even founder CEO firms) lose their premium after 
poor performance when their agency problem is intensified. In contrast, professional CEO family 
firms command a premium over non-family firms after poor performance, consistent with their 
reduced agency problem due to effective monitoring by the founding family. 
Our paper also contributes to the CEO turnover literature by linking the two types of 
agency problems to the cross-sectional variation of performance-turnover sensitivity among the 
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three types of US public firms. Extant studies on CEO turnover generally focus on identifying 
key determinants of CEO turnover, such as past performance, age, founder status, CEO 
ownership, industry competition, and risk, without exploring the variation in agency problems 
across firm types. While we control for all these variables, we show that firm type itself has 
significant effect on turnover-performance sensitivity over and above founder status and CEO 
ownership. We find that founding family presence, when combined with family management, 
lead to lower turnover-performance sensitivity, and when separated from management, leads to 
higher turnover-performance sensitivity. These results provide new evidence on the role of 
founding families in CEO turnover decisions.     
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that systematically examines the variation in CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity and firm valuation after poor performance among family CEO 
firms, professional CEO family firms, and non-family firms. Our paper is different from studies 
that examine the succession issue of family firms and its impact on subsequent performance (e.g., 
Bennedson et al., 2006). First, we compare the agency problems among different types of family 
firms and non-family firms, rather than focusing on the turnover decision within family firms. 
Second, unlike prior studies that take the CEO turnover decision as given and examine the 
subsequent firm performance after actual CEO turnover, we investigate the impact of prior 
performance on the likelihood of CEO turnover. Thus, our tests directly address the agency 
problem in US family firms that is related to not being able to replace poorly performing CEOs.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 covers data description. Section 4 reports empirical results of 
CEO turnover analysis, and Section 5 reports empirical results of firm valuation analysis. 
Conclusions are presented in Section 6.    
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature review 
A public company is a nexus of contracting relationships. Unavoidably, there are all sorts 
of conflicts of interests among its stakeholders. What has been examined the most in academic 
literature is probably the one between management and shareholders. This conflict arises when 
managers appropriate the corporate resources for their personal benefits, such as maximizing 
resources under control and consuming perquisites. Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally model 
the reduction in firm value caused by this conflict. In this paper, we refer to this conflict as Type I 
agency problem. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide an extensive literature review of studies on 
the Type I agency problem. 
Given the prevalence of Type I agency problem in a public company, the extant literature 
also investigates the mechanisms that can be used to alleviate it. In addition to the protection from 
the legal system, SEC, external/internal auditing, and corporate governance, one common 
measure that shareholders adopt to align managers’ interests with shareholders’ is to increase 
managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).1 Prior empirical evidence provides support 
for its efficacy. For example, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997a) document a negative relation 
between managerial ownership and diversification, Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) show that agency 
costs (excessive expenses and inefficient asset utilization) are inversely related to manager’s 
ownership, and Heitzman (2006) finds a positive relation between equity grants to target CEOs 
and acquisition premium. 
However, while high managerial ownership can alleviate Type I problem, it can potentially 
lead to Type II agency problem – the conflict of interests between large and small shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 1999; Gilson and Gordon, 2003). Large shareholders 
can potentially use their influence in the firm to expropriate small shareholders. Using Tobin’s Q 
                                                 
1 Note that managerial ownership in family CEO firms mainly results from original ownership (for founder 
CEOs) or inherited ownership (for descendant CEOs), rather than from stock-based compensation.  
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as a proxy for firm value, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) document a nonlinear relation 
between Tobin’s Q and managerial ownership: Tobin’s Q increases with managerial ownership 
when ownership increases from 0% to 5%, but then declines with it when ownership increases 
from 5% to 25%, consistent with a high level of managerial ownership leading to costly 
expropriation. (See Holderness (2003) for a literature review of Type II agency problem.)  
As noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the severity of agency problems varies from firm 
to firm, depending on the ease with which managers can exercise their own preferences in 
decision making as opposed to firm value maximization and on the cost of monitoring activities. 
Recent studies start to explore the variation of agency problems across different types of firms, in 
particular, US family versus non-family firms. Firm type fundamentally affects a firm’s 
ownership structure, which in turn affects the extent of agency problems. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) document that family firms outperform non-family firms across various measures: return 
on assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q. Villalonga and Amit (2006) further find that the 
family firm valuation premium over non-family firms mainly comes from family firms run by 
founder CEOs.  
The aforementioned papers attribute higher firm value in US family firms to their lack of 
agency problems.2 With the founding family likely being the largest and controlling shareholder 
of the company, it is difficult to imagine that family firms are free of agency problems, especially 
Type II agency problems. In fact, prior research finds evidence that family firms in other 
economies are subject to agency problems. For example, Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) focus 
on dividend policy in East Asian and European family firms and provide evidence of 
expropriation of other shareholders by the founding family, which is consistent with the Type II 
agency problem in family firms. Moreover, not all family firms are the same in terms of agency 
problems. In particular, family CEO firms are more likely to be subject to Type II agency 
                                                 
2 For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that the legal protection in US has successfully eliminated 
Type II agency problem in US family firms.  
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problems than professional CEO family firms. To provide evidence on agency problems in US 
family firms and the impact of agency problems on firm value, we focus our study on the CEO 
retention decision when a CEO has performed poorly and when the conflict of interests among 
CEO, small and large shareholders is likely intensified. We empirically examine how the two 
types of agency problems affect CEO retention decisions and ultimately firm valuation across the 
following three types of firms: family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms, and non-family 
firms.  
We choose to analyze the CEO retention decision for two reasons. First, to determine 
whether the incumbent CEO is competent for the job is one of the most significant decisions a 
board of directors has to make. As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), poorly performing 
managers who resist being replaced might be the costliest manifestation of agency problems. 
Accordingly, agency problems manifested in the CEO turnover context are likely to have a 
significant impact on firm value. Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 
(2004) both find that replacing a poorly performing CEO can improve firm performance and 
subsequently firm value, and Ertugrul and Krishnan (2007) document that delayed CEO dismissal 
leads to worse performance and higher incidence of bankruptcy and delisting. Second, CEO 
turnover provides us with a unique setting in which we can examine the extent of both types of 
agency problems in family firms, as developed in detail in the next section.   
Our analyses are related to both the recently developed literature on US family firms and 
the CEO turnover literature. Besides the above-mentioned studies on the valuation of family 
firms, recent studies also examine the impact of family ownership on earnings quality, CEO 
compensation, and the cost of debt. Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007) and Wang (2005) show 
that earnings quality is higher for family firms than for non-family firms. Chen (2005) reports that 
the compensation contracts for hired professional CEOs are more sensitive to firm performance in 
family firms than in non-family firms. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) document that family 
firms incur a lower cost of debt financing than non-family firms. Our paper differs from these 
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studies along at least two dimensions. First, we investigate both types of agency problems at the 
same time, while Chen (2005) only focuses on the Type I problem, and other prior studies do not 
distinguish between the two types of problems. Second, we link agency problems to firm value 
and identify a circumstance under which agency problems in family CEO firms lead to a 
reduction in firm value.    
Our analysis also complements CEO turnover studies. Prior work on CEO turnover has 
generally focused on determinants of CEO turnover: past performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 
1985; Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988), industry competition (DeFond and Park, 1999; Parrino, 
1997), composition of the board of directors (Weisbach, 1988), insider ownership (Denis, Denis, 
and Sarin, 1997b), and volatility (Dai, 2005). However, there is little research on differences 
across firm types. In this paper, we take advantage of the variation of agency problems among 
family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms, and non-family firms and examine how the 
varying agency problems lead to difference in CEO turnover-performance sensitivity across firm 
types, beyond the effect of firm and CEO characteristics examined by prior studies.  
 
2.2 Variation of CEO turnover-performance sensitivity across the three types of firms 
Following previous family firm studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006), we classify a firm as a family firm if the founders or their descendants hold the top 
management positions, sit on the board, or are blockholders.3 To capture the variation in agency 
problems among family firms, we further separate family firms into those run by family members 
(founders or descendants) and those run by hired professional CEOs. Thus, we explore the 
differences in agency problems across the following three types of US public firms:  
- family CEO firms: family firms with a member of the founding family (founder or 
descendant) as CEO; 
                                                 
3 Some might argue that this family firm definition is rather general, and in particular, it does not impose 
any restrictions on family ownership. If this is the case, it will bias against finding results consistent with 
our hypotheses. In a robustness check, we reclassify family firms by restricting the family ownership to be 
at least 1% (or 5%) and we find similar results.      
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- professional CEO family firms: family firms with a hired professional CEO; and  
- non-family firms: all other public firms.   
 
We now discuss the extent of the agency problems in the CEO turnover setting for each of the 
three types of firms and the implications for turnover-performance sensitivity and firm valuation. 




Type I  
agency problem 








Family CEO firms Moderate Severe Low Low 
Professional CEO 
family firms Moderate Moderate High High 
Non-family firms  Severe Moderate Low Low 
 
Figure 1 Agency problems and empirical predictions  
 
In a family CEO firm, since the founding family holds the CEO position, Type I agency 
problem should be moderate. However, with considerable influence from the founding family 
over corporate decisions, Type II agency problem is potentially severe when the family CEO has 
performed poorly and it becomes an issue whether to replace the incumbent CEO. The founding 
family may protect the poorly performing family CEO either for the benefit of this particular 
family member or for some other non-pecuniary reasons, such as maintaining family 
legacy/name, despite that not replacing the poorly-performing family CEO could potentially hurt 
firm value and reduce the family’s wealth. Indeed, holding important executive positions has 
been regarded as an important private benefit of having a large ownership (Holderness, 2003).4 
In contrast, in a professional CEO family firm or a non-family firm, ownership is separated 
from management; accordingly, Type I agency problem arises. However, what distinguishes a 
professional CEO family firm from a non-family firm is the direct monitoring of the CEO by the 
                                                 
4 Observing the recent poor performance at Ford, Business Week (August 21/28, 2006) commented that 
“CEO Bill Ford would have been fired by now by most boards if his name were Smith.” 
 11
founding family in the former. Such monitoring is effective because the founding family has the 
expertise, the incentive, as well as the means to do so. First, since the founding family started the 
business, the family members know the business well so that it is easier for them than for other 
shareholders (including other blockholders) to judge whether the incumbent CEO is competent. 
Second, the founding family also has stronger incentives than other shareholders (including other 
blockholders) to monitor the CEO, given its less diversified asset holding, family name concern, 
and long investment horizon (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003). Lastly, with large 
ownership and usually with representatives sitting on the board, the founding family is influential 
over key corporate decisions, including the CEO turnover decision. Consequently, Type I agency 
problems in professional CEO family firms can be effectively alleviated compared to those in 
non-family firms. 
Is Type II agency problem a concern in professional CEO family firms or non-family firms 
with respect to the CEO retention decision? If the CEOs in these firms hold a large percentage of 
shares, then these firms are susceptible to Type II agency problem as well. However, such cases 
are rare. In our sample, only 2.8% of hired CEOs (in both professional CEO family firms and 
non-family firms) hold 5% or more of the company’s stock. In addition, in a professional CEO 
family firm, since the CEO is not part of the founding family, the founding family is unlikely to 
protect the CEO from being fired due to poor performance. Similarly, the outside blockholders, if 
they exist, do not have the incentive to side with the poorly performing CEO in either 
professional CEO family firms or non-family firms.5 Consequently, the Type II agency problem 
related to the CEO retention decision is moderate in these two types of firms.     
In summary, over the CEO retention decision, professional CEO family firms face 
moderate Type I and Type II agency problems. In contrast, family CEO firms are subject to 
severe Type II agency problems and non-family firms are subject to severe Type I agency 
                                                 
5 Outside blockholders in these two types of firms might alleviate the Type I agency problem over the CEO 
retention decision. Thus, in a sensitivity test we control for the existence of outside blockholders.  
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problems. Since both types of agency problem will reduce the CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity, we predict that the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity for family CEO firms and 
non-family firms is lower than the sensitivity for professional CEO family firms. Stated formally, 
our first set of hypotheses is (in alternative forms): 6 
H1: CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for family CEO firms than for 
professional CEO family firms.  
 
H2: CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for non-family firms than for 
professional CEO family firms.  
 
Since family CEO firms are subject to severe Type II agency problems and non-family firms are 
subject to severe Type I agency problems, ex ante it is unclear which type of firm is subject to 
greater agency problems. If over the CEO turnover decision, the agency problem in family CEO 
firms is more severe than that in non-family firms, the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is 
lower for family CEO firms than for non-family firms, and vice versa. 
Note that we are not arguing that the professional CEO family firm is in general the best 
organization form of the three. The foregoing discussion of agency problems across the three 
types of firms is restricted to the CEO turnover decision. The extent of agency problems might be 
different in other settings. 
 
2.3 Firm valuation differentials across the three types of firms  
 Replacing a poorly performing CEO can potentially improve firm performance and 
subsequently firm value. The evidence provided in prior research (e.g., Denis and Denis, 1995; 
Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004; Ertugrul and Krishnan, 2007) is consistent with this 
argument. Therefore, if agency problems are so severe that they prevent shareholders from 
replacing the poorly performing CEO, firm value will suffer. The more severe the agency 
                                                 
6 As in prior studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006), we treat firm type as exogenous, and empirically use lagged firm type to explain CEO 
turnover and firm value. In sensitivity tests, we address the potential endogeneity of firm type and firm 
value.  
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problems, the stronger the resistance from the poorly performing CEO, the lower the probability 
the CEO will be replaced, and the lower firm value will be. Since as argued above, family CEO 
firms are subject to more severe Type II agency problem and non-family firms are subject to 
more severe Type I agency problem than professional CEO family firms, we expect that all else 
equal, these two types of firms have lower value than professional CEO family firms after poor 
performance. Stated formally, our second set of hypotheses is (in alternative form): 
H3: Given poor performance, family CEO firms are valued lower than professional CEO 
family firms.  
 
H4: Given poor performance, non-family firms are valued lower than professional CEO 
family firms.  
 
Note that this set of hypotheses compares firm value among different types of firms. While poor 
performance itself leads to lower firm value for all three types of firms (relative to periods with 
good performance), it would not lead to systematic differential firm value among the three types 
of firms if there were no differences in the severity of agency problems among them during this 
time period. In addition, we explicitly control for performance (i.e., stock returns) in our tests to 
address any potential confounding effect of differential performance across firm types.  
  
3. Sample and Data 
Our sample consists of 3,472 firm-years from 1,145 firms in the S&P 1500 Index (S&P 500 
LargeCap, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices) covering the period 1996–1999.7 
These are the firms for which required data were available from Compustat (for financial 
accounting information), CRSP (for stock return information), ExecuComp, and Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) (for CEO turnover, ownership, and corporate governance 
information).  
                                                 
7 We acknowledge that our sample period coincides with the high-tech boom. However, we do not expect 
this to bias our inference in any particular direction due to the fact that our sample firms are from S&P 
1500. In addition, we control for firm age and industry effects in sensitivity tests and our results are robust.   
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Our collection of ownership and the founding-family-related information involves several 
steps.8 First, we start with ExecuComp and IRRC databases to identify key insiders (top 
executives and directors) for each company and to compile ownership for each insider.9 Second, 
for each firm-year, we collect information about the founding family: the identity of founders, 
whether founders or their family members are actively involved (e.g., holding key executive 
positions, being directors or blockholders), and if they are actively involved, the ownership of the 
founding family. This step is completed through reading Hoover’s Company Records, company 
proxy statements and websites. Third, from proxy statements we collect the identities and 
ownership of blockholders who are not insiders or founding family members. Lastly, we merge 
the above information with firm financial data from Compustat and CRSP. Additional 
information about corporate governance and institutional ownership is collected from IRRC and 
CDA Spectrum, respectively.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the composition of our sample. In contrast to prior studies on 
family firms that focus on S&P 500 or Fortune 500 firms, our sample includes 1,313 firm-years 
from S&P 500, 925 firm-years from S&P MidCap 400, and 1,201 firm-years from S&P SmallCap 
600.10 Given that family firms are on average smaller, 46% of the firm-years in our sample are 
from family firms, a higher percentage than in prior studies. Of the family firm group, 63% are 
family CEO firms (1,002 firm-years), and 37% are professional CEO family firms (599 firm-
years). Among the 1,002 family CEO firm-years, 698 have founder CEOs and 302 have 
                                                 
8 Our data collection process is similar to Villalonga and Amit (2006). The advantage of this process is that 
it generates a rich dataset that enables us to examine the impact of various dimensions of ownership 
structure and founding family involvement (e.g., family management, family ownership) on CEO turnover. 
9 During our data collection, we notice two issues with the ownership data reported in ExecuComp and 
IRRC databases: (1) The databases often report the total family ownership under each individual family 
member. (2) For companies with more than one class of voting shares (dual-class firms), the databases 
usually only report ownership in one class of shares (the choice of class seems arbitrary), and occasionally 
report the combined voting power. When these issues arise, we resort to proxy statements to make 
corrections. The ownership data for dual-class firms in this paper is based on the combined voting power.  
10 There are 33 firm-year observations with missing index classification information. Although they are not 
included in our index classification, they are included in our firm type classification and in the empirical 
analyses.  
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descendant CEOs (untabulated). The distribution based on the number of unique firms is very 
similar.   
Panel B of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the full sample and for each of the 
three types of firms. Family ownership is higher in family CEO firms than in professional CEO 
family firms (20.7% vs. 15.3%). Overall, 12.5% of the sample experiences CEO turnover. As 
expected, CEO turnover probability in non-family firms (12.9%) and family CEO firms (8.9%) is 
significantly lower than in professional CEO family firms (17.4%) (p-value < 0.01). In the 
sample, 76% of incoming CEOs for family CEO firms that experience CEO turnover are from 
outside the founding family while 24% of family CEOs pass the baton to their family members 
(untabulated). For the full sample, the mean (median) CEO age is 55.4 (55) and the mean 
(median) CEO tenure is 8.1 (6) years. CEOs in professional CEO family firms are on average 
slightly younger than their counterparts in family CEO and non-family firms. The average CEO 
tenure for professional CEO family firms and non-family firms (4.3 and 6 years, respectively) is 
much shorter than for family CEO firms (14.3 years).  
Panel B also reports firm characteristics and corporate governance variables. Stock 
performance, measured as annual market-adjusted stock returns (using value-weighted market 
returns), is insignificantly different across the three types of firms – the median is similar and the 
mean is higher for family CEO firms due to some right-tail outliers.11 Return on assets is higher 
for family CEO firms. Non-family firms are on average larger than professional CEO family 
firms, which are larger than family CEO firms. On average, family CEO firms have the highest 
Tobin’s Q, followed by professional CEO family firms and then by non-family firms. Also, 
family firms are less likely to use leverage and equity compensation than non-family firms. The 
three types of firms are not statistically different from each other in other firm characteristics, 
including industry competition, growth, and return volatility. Non-family firms on average have 
                                                 
11 The negative means/medians of market-adjusted returns are caused by the inclusion in the market index 
of NASDAQ stocks, which experienced high stock returns during the sample period.  
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better corporate governance than professional CEO family firms and family CEO firms (more 
independent boards, higher institutional ownership, higher outside blockholding, and fewer 
instances of dual class share structures), except for G-score, the ordering on which is opposite.  
 
4. Tests of H1 and H2: CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity  
4.1 Primary analyses 
We use the following logit regression to test whether CEO turnover-performance sensitivity 


























   (1) 
where: 
CEO_turnover = 1 for firm-years with CEO turnover in the next year, and 0 otherwise; 
Performance = annual market-adjusted stock returns; 
D_FamilyCEO = 1 for family CEO firms, and 0 otherwise; 
D_NonFamily = 1 for non-family firms, and 0 otherwise; 
CEO_age = CEO’s age in years; 
CEO_tenure = the number of years the CEO has been at the current position; 
Size = firm size, measured as log transformation of total assets (in millions); 
N_firm = the number of firms in the same industry (defined based on 3-digit SIC codes) in   
Compustat. 
 
Firm and year subscripts are omitted for brevity. Note that all independent variables are measured 
in the year before CEO turnover. 
The parameters of interest are the interactions between the performance measure and the 
two dummy variables indicating family CEO firms (D_FamilyCEO) and non-family firms 
(D_NonFamily). The coefficient on the performance measure, α1, captures the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity for professional CEO family firms; the coefficient on the interaction 
between the performance measure and D_FamilyCEO, α1a, captures the incremental sensitivity 
for family CEO firms; and the coefficient on the interaction between the performance measure 
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and D_NonFamily, α1b, captures the incremental sensitivity for non-family firms. Since turnover-
performance sensitivity is negative, H1 and H2 imply that both α1a and α1b are positive. The net 
performance sensitivity for family CEO firms (non-family firms) is α1 + α1a (α1 + α1b), and the 
difference between family CEO firms and non-family firms is α1a - α1b. We also include the two 
firm-type dummy variables in the model to capture the difference in the CEO turnover probability 
independent of firm performance across firm types. 
Following prior empirical research on CEO turnover (e.g., Denis et al., 1997b), we control 
for CEO age, CEO tenure, firm size, and industry competition. Older CEOs are more likely to 
leave the position due to health, retirement, or other reasons. Prior research finds that after 
controlling for CEO age, CEO turnover probability decreases with CEO tenure, which likely 
reflects a CEO’s power accumulated over time in the CEO position. Prior research also finds that 
CEO turnover probability is lower for large firms than for small firms. Another important 
determinant of CEO turnover is industry competition. Both DeFond and Park (1999) and Parrino 
(1997) find a positive relation between CEO turnover probability and industry competition.  
Following Dai (2005), we use the number of firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry to measure 
industry competition.12, 13  
Table 2 reports the regression results. We compute the marginal effect for each variable to 
assess the economic significance of our estimates. As in prior research (e.g., Denis et al., 1997b), 
we calculate the change in implied CEO turnover probability when the variable of interest 
changes from its 25th to 75th percentile value, or from 0 to 1 if the variable is a dummy variable, 
with all other explanatory variables held constant at their respective means.  
Before discussing variables of interest, we would like to note that the results for all of the 
control variables (except CEO tenure) are consistent with prior literature. CEO age has a strong 
                                                 
12 Another commonly used proxy for industry competition is Herfindahl index. In our sample, Herfindahl 
index is highly correlated with the number of firms in the same industry: the correlation coefficient is -0.66. 
Including Herfindahl index as an additional control does not affect the results on other variables.  
13 The inferences are the same when year dummies are included to address potential correlations among 
observations in our panel data. 
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positive impact on CEO turnover; firm size is negatively correlated with turnover probability; and 
industry competition has a positive effect on CEO turnover.  
As reported in the table, the turnover-performance sensitivity is significantly negative for 
professional CEO family firms. More importantly, consistent with our predictions in H1 and H2, 
both incremental sensitivities are positive and significant at the 0.01 level. That is, CEO turnover 
is less sensitive to performance for both family CEO firms and non-family firms. The increase in 
CEO turnover probability when stock return decreases from its 75th to 25th percentile value is 13.7 
percentage points for professional CEO family firms, but it is 13.6 percentage points lower for 
family CEO firms and 10.1 percentage points lower for non-family firms. These differences in 
turnover-performance sensitivity are economically significant given that the sample average CEO 
turnover probability is about 13% and that the implied change in CEO turnover probability for 
age, which has been regarded as the most important explanatory variable for CEO turnover, is 
9.6%. Note that the marginal effect of performance for professional CEO family firms is larger 
than that reported in prior studies for average firms. This is simply due to our partitioning of the 
sample. Without separating the sample into different firm types, the marginal effect of 
performance is 3.1%, comparable to prior studies (untabulated). Apparently firm type creates 
large disparity in turnover-performance sensitivity.  
An alternative explanation of our results is that professional CEO family firms hire less 
talented CEOs and consequently they are more likely to be replaced after poor performance. We 
rule out this possibility based on the following. First, since the founding family stands to gain the 
most from good performance, it is thus likely that the founding family will hire more talented, 
rather than less talented, professional CEOs. Second, as we show below in our valuation analysis, 
we find that professional CEO family firms have higher firm value after poor performance than 
both family CEO firms and non-family firms. This result is inconsistent with the argument that 
professional CEO family firms have less talented CEOs.  
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The bottom of Table 2 reports the net turnover-performance sensitivity for family CEO 
firms and for non-family firms and the difference between the two. While the marginal effect of 
performance is as high as 13.7% for professional CEO family firms, it is only 3.6% (statistically 
significant) for non-family firms and is indistinguishable from zero (both statistically and 
economically) for family CEO firms. The difference between the latter two is significantly 
different from zero at the 0.007 level, suggesting that the agency problem in the CEO turnover 
setting is more severe for family CEO firms than for non-family firms. 
 
4.2 Additional analyses: Controlling for CEO ownership, founder status, and the level 
of family ownership 
The analyses presented above provide consistent evidence that severe Type II agency 
problem in family CEO firms and Type I agency problem in non-family firms reduce their CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity. In this subsection, we investigate the significance of our results 
relative to CEO ownership or founder status, two factors which likely correlate with our firm type 
classification. Given that prior research has documented significant impact on CEO turnover of 
these two variables, it is important for us to show that firm type itself affects CEO turnover over 
and above CEO ownership or founder status. In addition, we also test whether the level of family 
ownership has incremental impact on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity over firm types.   
CEO equity ownership provides the CEO with economic incentive to exert effort in 
general, but it is also likely to make the CEO entrenched and difficult to be replaced when he has 
performed poorly. This leads to a negative association between turnover-performance sensitivity 
and CEO ownership, as documented in Denis et al. (1997b). To investigate whether our results 
are driven by differential CEO ownership in the three types of firms, we add both CEO ownership 
and the interaction of CEO ownership with performance to regression (1).  Panel A of Table 3 
provides the empirical results. Consistent with prior research, we find that CEO ownership has a 
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negative impact on turnover probability and reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity. 
However, our results of interest, the differences in CEO turnover-performance sensitivity among 
the three types of firms, remain the same. This shows that firm type itself is an important factor in 
explaining CEO turnover decision above and beyond CEO ownership.  
Prior research finds that founder status reduces CEO turnover probability (e.g., Brickley 
2003). Given that family CEOs consist of founder CEOs and descendant CEOs, we partition 
family CEO firms into founder CEO family firms and descendant CEO family firms. We 
separately examine the effect of founder CEO and descendant CEO on CEO turnover probability 
and turnover-performance sensitivity. Panel B of Table 3 reports the empirical results. Column 
(1) provides results when founder CEO dummy and descendant CEO dummy are included. 
Consistent with prior studies, founder status affects turnover probability negatively. This negative 
effect also applies to descendant CEOs (the coefficients on the two dummies are similar). In 
Column (2), we add the interaction of the two dummies with performance. We find that both 
founder CEOs and descendant CEOs are associated with lower turnover-performance sensitivity 
than professional CEOs in family firms. Descendant CEOs are associated with even lower 
turnover-performance sensitivity than founder CEOs. Again, with founder CEO control, our 
turnover-performance sensitivities consistently differ across firm types as predicted.  
Given that the aggravation of Type II agency problem in family CEO firms and the 
alleviation of Type I agency problem in professional CEO family firms result from the founding 
family’s presence, we expect that the effect of the family presence is stronger when the level of 
family ownership is higher. To test this implication, we use 25% ownership as a cutoff and 
further partition family firms into high family ownership group and low family ownership group. 
Consequently, we have four types of family firms: professional CEO family firms with low or 
high family ownership, and family CEO firms with low or high family ownership. The regression 
results are reported in Panel C of Table 3. Note that in this regression, the coefficient on 
performance captures the turnover-performance sensitivity for professional CEO family firms 
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with low family ownership. As expected, professional CEO family firms with high family 
ownership have an even higher sensitivity (coef.=-2.56, p=0.050), consistent with better 
monitoring of hired CEOs by founding families with higher ownership. Also as expected, the 
turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for family CEO firms with high family ownership than 
for those with low family ownership (coef.=1.78, p=0.026), consistent with more severe Type II 
agency problems in the former. These results reinforce the inferences from the main turnover 
analyses: family ownership, when separated from management, can lead to effective monitoring 
of CEOs, but when combined with management, can lead to severe Type II agency problems. 
 
4.3 Other sensitivity tests 
To check the robustness of our CEO turnover results, we conduct a series of sensitivity 
tests by controlling for corporate governance, by using alternative performance measures, and by 
examining forced CEO turnover. Our inferences regarding H1 and H2 remain unchanged.  
First, since family firms differ from non-family firms in corporate governance, we test 
whether our inferences would change after controlling for the difference in corporate governance. 
To this end, we add the following control variables that could potentially affect CEO turnover 
decision: board independence (Weisbach, 1988), institutional ownership and the existence of 
blockholders other than the founding family (Holderness, 2003), G-score (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2003), and dual class structure (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2004).  The measurement 
of these variables follows prior studies. The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 4. Three 
out of the five corporate governance variables (board independence, institutional ownership, and 
G-score) are statistically significant in predicted directions: firms with stronger corporate 
governance have higher CEO turnover probability. Interestingly, the existence of outside 
blockholders does not increase CEO turnover probability after controlling for other factors. 
Additional analyses, not tabulated for the sake of brevity, indicate that the existence of outside 
blockholders does not increase turnover-performance sensitivity either. This result suggests that 
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family blockholders are more effective monitors in the CEO turnover setting than other 
blockholders. Last and more importantly, our estimates of turnover-performance sensitivities for 
the three types of firms are quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 2. So we conclude 
that the variation in corporate governance across firm types does not affect our results.14  
Second, we investigate whether our results are robust to alternative performance measures. 
We test H1 and H2 using the following three alternative measures: average market-adjusted stock 
returns in the past three years (Table 4, Column (2)), volatility-adjusted stock returns (Column 
(3)), and an accounting performance measure: industry-adjusted return on assets (Column (4)). 
The first measure captures the persistence of poor performance and the second controls for the 
volatility in stock returns. If a CEO happens to have a poor performance in a year due to bad luck, 
the board might not consider replacing the CEO. However, persistent poor performance is more 
likely to prompt the board to take action.15 Following Dai (2005), we control for return volatility 
when using the volatility-adjusted stock return measure in Column (3). Finally, prior studies have 
shown that accounting performance can also explain CEO turnover, although it is not as powerful 
as stock returns, which contain more information than historically-based accounting performance 
(e.g., DeFond and Park, 1999; Engel, Hayes, and Wang, 2003).  
As reported in Columns (2), (3), and (4), the results on turnover-performance sensitivities 
are similar when these alternative performance measures are used. The sensitivity is significantly 
negative in professional CEO family firms and becomes significantly weaker (i.e., less negative) 
in family CEO firms and non-family firms. Note that the magnitudes of the coefficients using 
these alternative performance measures are not directly comparable due to the scale difference in 
the measures. In sum, our inferences are robust to these alternative performance measures.  
                                                 
14 In untabulated tests, we also add to the regression the interaction of performance and corporate 
governance variables. The coefficients on our variables of interest remain similar.  
15 Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) find that the more powerful the CEO (e.g., founder CEOs), the 
more volatile the firm performance will be. By using the average return of the past three years and 
volatility-adjusted stock returns, we control for the potential impact of volatility on our results. 
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Third, we use forced CEO turnover to test H1 and H2 to see whether the inferences are 
similar. The advantage of examining forced turnover is that forced turnover supposedly better 
captures CEO turnover due to poor performance, but the drawback is the subjectivity we have to 
apply in classifying the turnover events.16 Given the bias embedded in the statement announcing 
CEO turnover, we define a forced turnover as either when the statement says that the CEO is 
fired, demoted, or forced to resign, or when the statement says that the CEO is retiring, but the 
CEO is 60 or younger at the time. This classification is similar to that used in prior research (e.g., 
Huson et al., 2004). Based on this classification, 233 firm-years of our sample experienced forced 
turnover, a probability of 6.7%.  The logit regression results for forced turnover are reported in 
Table 5.17 Consistent with the results based on all CEO turnover and our hypotheses, the forced 
turnover results indicate that professional CEO family firms have the highest turnover-
performance sensitivity, followed by non-family firms and then by family CEO firms.  
Lastly, it is possible that increased CEO turnover is not only associated with poor 
performance, but also associated with good performance. A CEO with exceptionally good 
performance might be attracted away by higher pay or higher social status. While this possibility 
itself will not drive our results, as it actually leads to a positive relation between CEO turnover 
probability and performance, the variation of such possibility across firm types might confound 
our results. For example, founders may be more likely to pass the CEO position on to descendants 
after good performance, leading to lower turnover-performance sensitivity in family CEO firms. 
We conduct two analyses to address this alternative explanation. First, we focus on the sub-
sample with good performance – firm-years with performance higher than the median – and find 
that there is no reliable relation between CEO turnover and performance, suggesting that the 
                                                 
16 Apparently to avoid negative publicity for both the company and the CEO involved, the announcement a 
company makes regarding CEO turnover is unlikely to be straightforward. For example, many firms would 
choose to use the word “retirement” for the outgoing CEO even though the accompanying information may 
indicate otherwise. Accordingly, we have to use judgment in determining the nature of CEO turnover. We 
collect CEO turnover announcements from Lexis and Nexis. 
17 Following Denis et al. (1997b), we do not include CEO age as an explanatory variable because forced 
turnover should not depend on CEO age. 
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alternative explanation is unlikely to hold. Second, we replicate our main analyses after deleting 
the top 10%, 25% or even 50% performers and obtain similar inferences, also suggesting that our 
results are not driven by CEO turnover after good performance. 
Overall, the empirical tests from Table 2 to Table 5 provide strong support to our first set of 
hypotheses (H1 and H2): both family CEO firms and non-family firms have lower turnover-
performance sensitivity than professional CEO family firms. The differences in sensitivities are 
both statistically and economically significant. We conclude from these results that while the 
founding family’s presence has mitigated agency problems in professional CEO family firms, it 
apparently has aggravated the agency problems related to CEO retention decisions in family CEO 
firms.  
 
5. Tests of H3 and H4: Differential firm valuation across firm types 
5.1 Primary analyses 
Our empirical results presented in Section 4 provide consistent evidence that with regard to 
CEO turnover decision, family CEO firms and non-family firms are subject to more severe 
agency problems than professional CEO family firms. Given that agency cost, or the difficulty in 
replacing poorly performing CEOs, can lead to a reduction in firm value, we now examine 
whether, as hypothesized in H3 and H4, professional CEO family firms have higher firm value 
than family CEO firms or non-family firms after poor performance. Since we are interested in the 
firm value comparison during the time period when a firm is likely facing a CEO turnover 
decision, we focus our tests on the poor performance period. For completeness, we also extend 
the analysis to other periods (i.e., periods other than the poor performance period). Note that this 
design is different from prior studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), 
which focus only on firm-type partition (e.g., family firms vs. non-family firms) and do not 
condition the analyses on past firm performance. 
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Following Morck et al. (1988), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), we use Tobin’s Q as our proxy for firm value and regress Tobin’s Q at the end of the year 
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  (2) 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of a firm’s market value of assets to its book value of assets. 
The choice and measurement of control variables (i.e., firm size, growth, return volatility, 
leverage, board independence, blockholding, and CEO equity compensation) are the same as in 
prior research to facilitate comparisons. H3 and H4 imply that α1 < 0 and α2 < 0, respectively, 
after the poor performance period. In our empirical tests, the poor performance period refers to 
those firm-years when the market-adjusted return falls in the bottom quartile of the sample 
distribution.18 Note that β, γ, and δ are vectors. 
          One particular control variable that we include is stock return. This control is important to 
us because we would like to remove any concern that our results are driven by differential stock 
return across the three types of firms. Even though all the firms used in the poor performance 
period analysis have stock return in the bottom quartile of the sample distribution, if family CEO 
firms or non-family firms have lower stock return than professional CEO family firms, then 
results consistent with H3 and H4 could simply be due to the mechanical relation between stock 
return and Tobin’s Q. 
Table 6 presents the empirical results. Column (1) reports the results for the poor 
performance period. As predicted in H3 and H4, we find that professional CEO family firms are 
valued at a premium over both family CEO firms and non-family firms for this poor performance 
period. Tobin’s Q is 0.235 lower for family CEO firms and 0.151 lower for non-family firms than 
for professional CEO family firms. Both differences are statistically significant, with p-value of 
                                                 
18 The inferences are the same when we use alternative cutoff points (e.g., the bottom 20% or 30% of the 
sample distribution). 
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0.006 and 0.043 respectively. The bottom of Table 6 also compares the value of family CEO 
firms and that of non-family firms: the result indicates that the difference between the two types 
of firms is insignificant at conventional levels.  
These results are consistent with our hypotheses and the CEO turnover results discussed in 
Section 4. Relative to a professional CEO family firm, replacing a poorly performing CEO is 
more difficult in a family CEO firm due to its severe Type II agency problem or in a non-family 
firm due to its severe Type I agency problem. Expecting these, the stock market assigns lower 
value to non-family firms and family CEO firms, but higher value to professional CEO family 
firms after the poor performance period.  
Column (2) reports the results for other periods, i.e., periods with average or above-average 
performance. The empirical findings show that family CEO firms outperform non-family firms 
during these periods. This out-performance may be attributable to founder CEO expertise and/or 
the alleviation of agency problem, as suggested in prior research (Fahlenbrach, 2005; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006).  Results for the full sample, in Column (3), are basically weighted averages of 
the results in the previous two columns. They show a value premium of family CEO firms over 
non-family firms. 
One interesting issue that immediately follows from these results is whether the 
disappearance of valuation premium for family CEO firms (relative to non-family firms) during 
the poor performance period, as shown in Table 6, contradicts the well-established family firm 
premium and founder CEO premium (relative to non-family firms) (Anserson and Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). We now turn to this issue in the next subsection.  
 
5.2 Reconciliation with prior studies on family firm premium 
To reconcile our results with prior studies, we adopt the design in prior studies and estimate 


















We now use non-family firms as the benchmark group and investigate the average family firm 
premium (including both family CEO firms and professional CEO family firms) in the first 
specification and the premium/discount of each type of family firms – founder CEO, descendant 
CEO, and professional CEO family firms – in the second specification. The regression results are 
reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 7, respectively. Because Table 6 already compares 
professional CEO family firms with non-family firms, the following discussion focuses first on 
family firms as a group, then on founder CEO firms and descendant CEO firms. To highlight the 
importance of conditioning the valuation analyses on past firm performance, for each regression 
analysis we first estimate the regression using the full sample and then separately for the poor 
performance period and for other periods. 
We replicate the well-established family firm premium in Column (1) of Panel A. 
Consistent with prior studies, we find that family firms on average command higher value than 
non-family firms: Tobin’s Q is 0.184 higher, significant at the 0.002 level. However, when we 
separate the poor performance period from other periods, we find that family firm premium 
disappears for the poor performance period (the difference in Tobin’s Q is -0.036, insignificantly 
different from zero). On the other hand, family firm premium is significant in other periods: 
Tobin’s Q is 0.247 higher in family firms than in non-family firms. The disappearance of family 
firm premium in the poor performance period is apparently driven by family CEO firms, not by 
professional CEO family firms, which as shown in Table 6 (column (1)) enjoy a valuation 
premium over non-family firms in such a period.   
We further replicate the founder premium and descendant discount results as documented 
in Villilonga and Amit (2006) in Column (1) of Panel B. We find that, on average, founder CEOs 
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are associated with a significant premium (Tobin’s Q is 0. 279 higher) and descendant CEOs are 
associated with a significant discount (Tobin’s Q is 0.166 lower). However, when we partition the 
full sample into the two periods, we find that during the poor performance period, the founder 
premium disappears, and descendant discount becomes even larger. This result provides further 
consistent evidence linking our turnover analyses to valuation analyses. In contrast, during other 
periods, founder CEO firms enjoy a large premium, and descendant CEO firms are associated 
with an insignificant discount. 
In sum, while we confirm the well-established family firm premium (including founder 
CEO premium and descendant CEO discount) for the full sample, we show that the premium 
disappears and the discount increases when the agency problems in family CEO firms are severe. 
Specifically, during the poor performance period when agency problems related to the CEO 
retention decision are likely to be severe, family firms no longer command a value premium (over 
non-family firms). Furthermore, among family firms, founder CEOs lose the premium, 
descendant CEOs are associated with a large discount, and only professional CEO family firms 
have a valuation premium. These results suggest that the family presence mitigates agency 
problems in professional CEO firms while it aggravates agency problem in family CEO firms in 
the CEO turnover setting. 
 
5.3 Sensitivity Tests 
To check the robustness of our valuation results, we conduct the following sensitivity tests. 
(For the sake of brevity, we focus on the main results reported in Column (1) of Table 6 which 
tests H3 and H4.) First, we use lagged firm-type dummies in the valuation regression. The main 
motivation for this is to address the potential endogeneity between firm type and Tobin’s Q. One 
might argue that a family CEO firm might decide to stay as a family CEO firm if the founding 
family expects the future performance to be good or decide to transform itself into a professional 
CEO family firm or further into a non-family firm if the family expects future performance to be 
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bad. Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that this argument is arduous because it rests on a strong 
assumption that the founding family has special insights about future performance. The argument 
is even less relevant to our results as we find that given poor performance, family CEO firms 
have lower, not higher, firm value than professional CEO family firms. Nevertheless, we address 
this possible endogeneity issue by using lagged firm-type variables, which are unlikely to be 
affected by future Tobin’s Q. The results are presented in Column (1) of Table 8. The inferences 
remain the same. We observe a valuation premium during the poor performance period for 
professional CEO family firms over both family CEO firms and non-family firms. 
We also use a 2SLS approach to address the endogeneity issue as in prior research 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Specifically, we use as our instruments 
firm size, squared firm size, and return volatility, along with other controls to predict firm type, 
and then use the predicted firm type to explain Tobin’s Q. Since we cannot predict the three types 
of firms at the same time, we separately investigate family CEO firm discount and non-family 
firm discount (relative to professional CEO family firms). Because this design (i.e., using two 
separate regressions, rather than one regression, to test H3 and H4) is different from other 
analyses reported so far, we do not report the results from this 2SLS approach, which lead to the 
same inferences as the main analyses.  
Second, rather than using stock returns, we use operating performance as our partition 
variable. We define the poor performance period as firm-years with industry-adjusted return on 
assets falling into the bottom quintile of the sample distribution. The results are reported in 
Column (2) of Table 8. Once again, the coefficient estimates associated with both family CEO 
firm dummy and non-family firm dummy are consistent with our main results.  
Overall, these sensitivity tests indicate that our results are robust: family CEO firms and 
non-family firms have a lower value than professional CEO family firms during a time period 




Agency problems with the CEO retention decision are likely to be severe when a CEO has 
performed poorly. Such agency problems can reduce the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity 
and firm value. In this paper, we examine how the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity varies 
across three types of firms – family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms, and non-family 
firms – in order to shed light on the impact of the founding family’s presence on agency 
problems. Whether family firms are subject to agency problems depends on family firm type. For 
professional CEO family firms, effective monitoring by the founding family mitigates the 
potential Type I agency problem relative to non-family firms, leading to a higher CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity. However, for family CEO firms, the founding family protects the family 
CEO from being fired due to poor performance and thus aggravates Type II agency problem, 
leading to a lower turnover-performance sensitivity than professional CEO family firms. The 
empirical results are consistent with both predictions.   
We then investigate how the agency problems manifested in the CEO turnover decision 
affect firm value during the poor performance period. We find that, during the poor performance 
period, professional CEO family firms, which are subject to less severe agency problems in the 
CEO turnover setting, are valued at a premium over both family CEO firms and non-family firms. 
In addition, relative to non-family firms, family firms as a whole do not enjoy valuation premium 
during the poor performance period. Founder CEOs are associated with no valuation premium, 
descendant CEOs are associated with a significant valuation discount, and only professional CEO 
family firms enjoy a valuation premium. These results contrast with the family firm valuation 
premium documented in prior studies. The finding in prior studies is apparently attributed to other 
periods, when agency problems over the CEO turnover setting in family CEO firms are not as 
severe as during the poor performance period.  
Overall, our analyses indicate that in the CEO turnover setting, the presence of the 
founding family has a significant impact on the agency problems. While it reduces the agency 
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problems between shareholders and managers when the family does not serve as the CEO, i.e., in 
the case of professional CEO family firms, it aggravates the agency problem between small and 
large shareholders when a family member serves as the CEO. Such impact is systematically 






Adams, Renee, Heitor Almeida, and Daniel Ferreira, 2005, Powerful CEOs and their impact on 
corporate performance, Review of Financial Studies 18, 1403-1432. 
Ali, Ashiq, Tai-Yuan Chen, and Suresh Radhakrishnan, 2007, Corporate disclosures by family 
firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming. 
Anderson, Ronald, and David Reeb, 2003, Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500, Journal of Finance 58, 1301-1328. 
Anderson, Ronald, Sattar Mansi, and David Reeb, 2003, Founding-family ownership and the 
agency cost of debt, Journal of Financial Economics 68, 263-285.  
Ang, James S., Rebel A. Cole, and James W. Lin, 2000, Agency costs and ownership structure, 
Journal of Finance 55, 81-106. 
Bennedsen, Morten, Kasper Nielsen, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, and Daniel Wolfenzon, 2006, 
Insider the family firm: The role of family succession decision and performance, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
Brickley, James, 2003, Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: A discussion, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 227-233.  
Chen, Tai-Yuan, 2005, CEO compensation contract of family firms, University of Texas at Dallas 
working paper. 
Coughlan, Anne, and Ronald Schmidt, 1985, Executive compensation, management turnover, and 
firm performance: An empirical investigation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 43-
66. 
Dai, Zhonglan, 2005, What matters more for CEO turnover: Performance or risk? Unpublished 
Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
DeFond, Mark, and Chul Park, 1999, The effect of competition on CEO turnover, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 27, 35-56. 
Denis, David, and Diana Denis, 1995, Performance changes following top management 
dismissals, Journal of Finance 50, 1029-1058. 
Denis, David, Diana Denis, and Atulya Sarin, 1997a, Agency problems, equity ownership, and 
corporate diversification, Journal of Finance 52, 135-160. 
Denis, David, Diana Denis, and Atulya Sarin, 1997b, Ownership structure and top executive 
turnover, Journal of Financial Economics 45, 194-221. 
Engel, Ellen, Rachel Hayes, and Xue Wang, 2003, CEO turnover and properties of accounting 
information, Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 197-226. 
Ertugrul, Mine, and Karthik Krishnan, 2007, CEO dismissal timing and costs of delayed action: 
Do some boards act too late? Boston College working paper. 
Faccio, Mara, Larry Lang, and Leslie Young, 2001, Dividends and expropriation, American 
Economic Review 91, 54-78.  
Fahlenbrach, Rudiger, 2005, Founder-CEOs and stock market performance, Ohio State 
University working paper. 
 33
Gilson, Ronald, and Jeffrey Gordon, 2003, Controlling shareholders, Stanford University working 
paper.   
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107-155. 
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, 2004, Incentive vs. control: An analysis of US 
dual-class companies, NBER working paper. 
Heitzman, Shane, 2006, Equity grants to target CEOs prior to acquisitions, University of Arizona 
working paper. 
Holderness, Clifford, 2003, A survey of blockholders and corporate control, FRBNY Economic 
Policy Review, 51-64.  
Huson, Mark, Paul Malatesta, and Robert Parrino, 2004, Managerial succession and firm 
performance, Journal of Financial Economics 74, 237-275. 
Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate ownership 
around the world, Journal of Finance 52, 471-518. 
Lemmon, Michael, and Karl Lins, 2003, Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm 
value: Evidence from east asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance 58, 1445-1468.  
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and market 
valuation: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315. 
Parrino, Robert, 1997, CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis, Journal 
of Financial Economics 46, 165-197. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of 
Political Economy 94, 461-488. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1997, A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Finance 
52, 737-783. 
Villalonga, Belen, and Raphael Amit, 2006, How do family ownership, control and management 
affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics 80, 385-417. 
Wang, Dechun, 2005, Founding family ownership and earnings quality, Journal of Accounting 
Research 44, 619-656.  
Warner, Jerold, Ross Watts, and Karen Wruck, 1988, Stock prices and top management changes, 
Journal of Financial Economics 20, 461-492. 
Weisbach, Michael, 1988, Outside directors and CEO turnover, Journal of Financial Economics 
20, 431-460.  
 34
Table 1 Sample composition and descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the composition and characteristics of our sample, which consists of 3,472 firm-years 
from 1,145 firms in the S&P 1500 Index (S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P Small-Cap 600 indices) 
covering the period 1996-1999. 
 
Panel A Sample composition 
 
 Number of firm-years  Number of unique firms 
 N Percent  N Percent 
Total 3,472 100%  1,145 100% 
 
Composition by S&P Index*      
S&P 500  1,313 38%  361 32% 
S&P MidCap 400 925 27%  320 29% 
S&P SmallCap 600 1,201 35%  432 39% 
      
Composition by firm type      
Family firms  1,601 46%  545 48% 
Family CEO 1,002 29%  357 32% 
Professional CEO 599 17%  188 16% 
Non-family firms 1,871 54%  600 52% 
 
* 33 firm-years of 32 firms have missing index classification value in Compustat. 
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Table 1 Sample composition and descriptive statistics (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B Descriptive statistics 
This panel reports the descriptive statistics of CEO and firm characteristics for the full sample and for each type of firm. 
 
  
Full sample  
(N=3,472)  
Family CEO firms 
(N=1,002)  
Professional CEO family 
firms  (N=599)  
Non-family firms 
(N=1,871) 
  Mean Std. Median  Mean Std. Median  Mean Std. Median  Mean Std. Median 
Family ownership (%) 8.60 17.30 0  20.68 22.71 13.10  15.26 18.81 8.00  0 0 0 
CEO information                
CEO_turnover 0.125 0.331 0  0.089 0.285 0  0.174 0.379 0  0.129 0.335 0 
CEO_age 55.4 7.3 55  55.8 9.6 56  54.5 6.4 55  55.4 6.2 56 
CEO_tenure 8.1 7.8 6  14.3 9.7 13  4.3 4.1 3  6.0 5.1 5 
Firm characteristics                
Stock return -0.035 0.459 -0.103  0.013 0.557 -0.103  -0.047 0.407 -0.106  -0.058 0.412 -0.104 
Return on assets 0.020 0.084 0.013  0.023 0.101 0.018  0.015 0.090 0.013  0.021 0.071 0.011 
Size ($ million) 10,002 37,196 1,472  2,840 10,429 732  5,940 22,981 1,278  15,138 47,768 2,514 
N_firm 166 257 56  180 287 55  159 255 42  160 240 64 
Tobin’s Q 2.469 2.598 1.769  2.810 2.323 1.889  2.615 5.080 1.839  2.306 2.140 1.708 
Growth 0.046 0.117 0.005  0.065 0.162 0.000  0.026 0.052 0.000  0.042 0.099 0.008 
Return volatility 0.107 0.049 0.097  0.120 0.050 0.114  0.099 0.047 0.089  0.103 0.047 0.093 
Leverage 0.184 0.152 0.170  0.154 0.166 0.098  0.180 0.147 0.161  0.197 0.144 0.186 
CEO equity comp. (%) 40.04 29.44 40.75  33.62 32.49 28.75  34.90 28.73 31.43  43.41 27.62 44.33 
Corporate governance variables                
Board independence  0.612 0.180 0.625  0.509 0.179 0.500  0.560 0.154 0.583  0.684 0.153 0.706 
Inst. ownership (%) 58.22 18.49 59.37  54.47 18.93 53.80  55.44 18.10 56.36  61.14 17.87 63.09 
Blockholding (%) 14.82 12.97 12.80  13.17 11.83 11.45  13.62 12.51 10.40  16.09 13.56 14.46 
G-score 9.242 2.780 9.000  8.179 2.754 8.000  9.340 2.848 9.000  9.693 2.631 10.000 
Dual class 0.057 0.231 0.000  0.123 0.328 0.000  0.073 0.261 0.000  0.016 0.126 0.000 
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Table 1 Sample composition and descriptive statistics (Cont’d) 
 
Notes to Table 1:  
The variables are measured one year before CEO turnover and are defined as follows: 
Family ownership = percentage of shares held by the founding family; 
CEO_turnover = 1 for firm-years with CEO turnover in the next year, and 0 otherwise; 
CEO_age = CEO’s age in years; 
CEO_tenure = the number of years the CEO has been CEO; 
Stock return = annual market-adjusted stock return; 
Return on assets  = firm return on assets minus value-weighted industry return on assets; 
Size = firm size, measured as total assets (in millions); 
N_firm = the number of firms in the same industry (defined based on 3-digit SIC codes) in Compustat; 
Tobin’s Q = the ratio of a firm’s market value of assets to its book value of assets at year-end; 
Growth = R&D/total assets; 
Return volatility = the standard deviation of monthly market-adjusted stock returns; 
Leverage = long-term debt/total assets; 
CEO equity comp. = the value of the CEO’s annual stock and option grants divided by total CEO pay; 
Board independence = the proportion of independent directors sitting on the board of directors; 
Inst. ownership = percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors; 
Blockholding  = percentage of outstanding shares held by blockholders other than the founding family; 
G-score = count of anti-takeover measures developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); 
Dual class = 1 if the company has dual-class shares, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2 CEO turnover–performance sensitivity 
 





























The sample includes 3,472 firm-years in the period 1996-1999. The p-values (in the parentheses) are based 
on one-sided tests for directional predictions and on two-sided tests otherwise. The last column reports the 









Intercept ? -15.82  
  (0.001)  
Performance − -2.99 -13.7% 
  (0.001)  
Performance×D_FamilyCEO + 2.77 13.6% 
  (0.001)  
Performance×D_NonFamily + 1.38 10.1% 
  (0.013)  
D_FamilyCEO − -2.94 -10.7% 
  (0.001)  
D_NonFamily − -0.73 -5.8% 
  (0.001)  
CEO_age + 0.25 9.6% 
  (0.001)  
CEO_tenure − 0.01 0.3% 
  (0.793)  
Size − -0.16 -1.2% 
  (0.001)  
N_firm + 0.19 1.4% 
  (0.001)  
    
Likelihood ratio  560.5  
(p-value)  (0.001)  
Additional tests    
-0.22 -0.1% Turnover-performance sensitivity for family CEO firms (α1+α1a) 
 (0.632)  
-1.61 -3.6% Turnover-performance sensitivity for non-family firms  (α1+α1b) 
 (0.001)  
1.39 3.5% Difference in sensitivity between family CEO  
and non-family firms (α1a-α1b) (0.007)  
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Table 2 CEO turnover–performance sensitivity (Cont’d) 
 
Notes to Table 2:  
The variables are defined as follows: 
CEO_turnover = 1 for firm-years with CEO turnover in the next year, and 0 otherwise; 
Performance = annual market-adjusted stock return; 
D_FamilyCEO = 1 for family firms with a member from the founding family as the CEO, and 0 
otherwise; 
D_NonFamily = 1 for non-family firms, and 0 otherwise; 
CEO_age = CEO’s age in years; 
CEO_tenure = the number of years the CEO has been CEO; 
Size = firm size, measured as log transformation of total assets (in millions); 
N_firm = the number of firms in the same industry (defined based on 3-digit SIC codes) in 
Compustat. 
Note that all explanatory variables are measured in the year before CEO turnover is measured. 
 
* Implied change in the probability of CEO turnover is calculated as follows:  
• For Performance, it is calculated as the change in CEO turnover probability for professional CEO 
family firms, due to a change in performance from its 25th to its 75th percentile value, with the control 
variables taking their respective means. For Performance × D_FamilyCEO (Performance × 
D_NonFamily), it is calculated as the difference in the implied change in CEO turnover probability due 
to the change in performance between family CEO firms (non-family firms) and professional CEO 
family firms.  
• For D_FamilyCEO (D_NonFamily), it is calculated as the difference in CEO turnover probability 
between family CEO firms (non-family firms) and professional CEO family firms, with Performance 
and control variables taking their respective means.  
• For control variables (CEO_age, CEO_tenure, Size, N_firm), it is calculated as the change in CEO 
turnover probability when the given variable changes from its 25th to its 75th percentile value, with all 
other independent variables taking their respective means.  
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Table 3 Additional tests of CEO turnover–performance sensitivity  
 
Panel A  Controlling for CEO ownership  
 
This panel reports the results of the logit regression of CEO turnover probability on performance, firm type 
dummies, their interactions, and control variables. The specification is similar to equation (1) in Table 2, 
except that we add CEO ownership and the interaction of CEO ownership with performance. See Table 2 
for the measurement of other variables. The sample includes 3,472 firm-years in the period 1996–1999. 
The p-values in parentheses are based on one-sided tests for directional predictions and are based on two-







Both firm type and CEO 
ownership effects 
Intercept ? -18.70 -18.01 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Performance − -1.71 -3.84 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Performance×D_FamilyCEO +  3.31 
   (0.001) 
Performance×D_NonFamily +  2.45 
   (0.001) 
D_FamilyCEO −  -1.68 
   (0.001) 
D_NonFamily −  -0.40 
   (0.032) 
CEO ownership − -0.17 -0.13 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Performance×CEO ownership + 0.13 0.07 
  (0.006) (0.098) 
CEO_age + 0.29 0.28 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO_tenure − -0.01 0.02 
  (0.96) (0.956) 
Size − -0.14 -0.14 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
N_firm + 0.15 0.1483 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
    
Likelihood ratio  537.5 570.0 
(p-value)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Additional tests    
 -0.53 Turnover-performance sensitivity for family CEO firms (α1+α1a) 
  (0.318) 
 -1.39 Turnover-performance sensitivity for non-family firms  (α1+α1b) 
  (0.001) 
 0.86 Difference in sensitivity between family CEO  
and non-family firms (α1a-α1b)  (0.145) 
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Table 3 Additional tests of CEO turnover–performance sensitivity (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B  Partition of family CEO firms into founder CEO firms and descendant CEO firms 
 
This panel reports the results of the logit regression of CEO turnover probability on performance, firm type 
dummies, their interactions, and control variables. The specification is similar to equation (1) in Table 2, 
except that we partition family CEO firms into founder CEO firms and descendant CEO firms and interact 
these two dummies with firm performance. See Table 2 for the measurement of other variables. The sample 
includes 3,472 firm-years in the period 1996–1999. The p-values in parentheses are based on one-sided 










Intercept ? -15.75 -15.92 
  (0.001) (0.001)  
Performance − -2.98 -3.00 
  (0.001) (0.001)  
Performance×D_FamilyCEO + 2.89   
  (0.001)   
Performance×D_FounderCEO +  2.27 
   (0.002) 
Performance×D_DescendantCEO +  5.90 
   (0.001)  
Performance×D_NonFamily + 1.37 1.38 
  (0.014) (0.014) 
D_FounderCEO − -2.88 -2.90 
  (0.001) (0.001)  
D_DescendantCEO − -3.21 -3.41 
  (0.001) (0.001)  
D_NonFamily − -0.73 -0.73 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO_age + 0.25 0.25 
  (0.001) (0.001)  
CEO_tenure − 0.01 0.01 
  (0.654) (0.671) 
Size − -0.16 -0.16 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
N_firm + 0.19 0.20 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Likelihood ratio  559.0 566.6  
(p-value)  (0.001) (0.001)  
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Table 3 Additional tests of CEO turnover–performance sensitivity (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C The incremental impact of high family ownership  
 
This panel reports the results of the logit regression of CEO turnover probability on performance, firm type 
dummies, their interactions, and control variables. The specification is similar to equation (1) in Table 2, 
except that we add two more firm-type dummies and their interactions with firm performance: 
D_ProfessionalCEO_High and D_FamilyCEO_High. D_ProfessionalCEO_High (D_FamilyCEO_High) is 
1 for professional CEO family firms (Family CEO firms) in which family ownership is 25% or higher, and 
0 otherwise. See Table 2 for the measurement of other variables. The sample includes 3,472 firm-years in 
the period 1996–1999. The p-values in parentheses are based on one-sided tests for directional predictions 
and are based on two-sided tests otherwise.  
 
 Predicted signs   
Estimate 
 (p-value) 
Intercept ?   -16.65 
    (0.001) 
Performance −   -3.15 
    (0.001) 
Performance × D_ProfessionalCEO_High  −   -2.56 
    (0.050) 
Performance × D_FamilyCEO +   2.39 
    (0.002) 
Performance × D_FamilyCEO_High  +   1.78 
    (0.026) 
Performance × D_NonFamily +   1.52 
    (0.015) 
D_ProfessionalCEO_High +   -2.75 
    (0.535) 
D_FamilyCEO −   -2.18 
    (0.001) 
D_FamilyCEO_High −   -1.87 
    (0.001) 
D_NonFamily −   -0.68 
    (0.001) 
CEO_age +   0.27 
    (0.001) 
CEO_tenure −   0.00 
    (0.886) 
Size −   -0.16 
    (0.001) 
N_firm +   0.19 
    (0.001) 
 
Likelihood ratio    577.1 
(p-value)    (0.001) 
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Table 4 CEO turnover–performance sensitivity: Robustness check 
 
This table reports four sensitivity tests of the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity with additional 
controls (Column (1)) or using different performance measures (Columns (2), (3) and (4)). Alternative 
performance measures are: the average market-adjusted stock returns in the last three years (Column (2)), 
volatility-adjusted returns (Column (3)), and return on assets (Column (4)). The sample includes 3,472 
firm-years (2,948 firm-years in Column (1)) in the period 1996-1999. The p-values (in the parentheses) are 






















Intercept ? -15.34 -16.05 -19.17 -8.35 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Performance − -2.90 -4.93 -0.20 -5.69 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Performance ×D_FamilyCEO + 3.58 4.19 0.20 5.47 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Performance ×D_NonFamily + 1.53 1.95 0.11 3.47 
  (0.008) (0.056) (0.035) (0.032) 
D_FamilyCEO − -3.47 -2.85 -3.23 -1.58 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_NonFamily − -0.86 -0.72 -0.77 -0.68 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO_age + 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.14 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO_tenure − 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (0.992) (0.224) (0.852) (0.995) 
Size − -0.17 -0.13 -0.02 -0.16 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.645) (0.001) 
N_firm + 0.16 0.19 0.09 0.11 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.074) (0.004) 
D_Board indep. + 0.38    
  (0.040)    
Inst. Ownership + 0.01    
  (0.009)    
D_Blockholder  + -0.11    
  (0.732)    
G-score − -0.15    
  (0.001)    
Dual class − -0.00    
  (0.497)    
Return volatility  +   17.72  
    (0.001)  
Likelihood ratio  477.5 567.6 600.4 116.7 
(p-value)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Additional tests      
0.68 -0.74 0.00 -0.22 Turnover-performance sensitivity for family CEO firms 
(α1+α1a) (0.273) (0.310) (0.993) (0.855)  
-1.37 -2.98 -0.09 -1.22  Turnover-performance sensitivity for non-family firms 
(α1+α1b) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020)  
2.05 2.24 0.09 2.00  Difference in sensitivity between family CEO 
and non-family firms (α1a-α1b) (0.001) (0.012) (0.102) (0.109)  
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Table 4 CEO turnover–performance sensitivity: Robustness check (Cont’d) 
 
Notes to Table 4: 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Volatility-adj. returns = annual market-adjusted stock returns scaled by return volatility; 
Return on assets  = firm return on assets minus value-weighted industry return on assets; 
D_Board indep. = 1 if independent board members make up over 60% of the board, and 0 otherwise; 
Inst. ownership = percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors; 
D_Blockholder  = 1 if there is at least one blockholder other than the founding family; 
G-score = count of anti-takeover measures developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); 
Dual class = 1 if the company has dual-class share structure, and 0 otherwise; 
Return volatility = the standard deviation of monthly market-adjusted stock returns. 
See the notes to Table 2 for measurement of other variables. All explanatory variables are measured in the 
year before CEO turnover is measured. 
 44
  
Table 5 Forced CEO turnover–performance sensitivity 
 






























  (1′) 
A CEO turnover is classified as a forced turnover if the CEO is fired, demoted or forced to resign, or if the 
CEO is 60 or younger at the time of leaving the position. Please see Table 2 for the measurement of other 
variables. The sample includes 3,472 firm-years in the period 1996–1999. The p-values (in the parentheses) 
are based on one-sided tests for directional predictions and on two-sided tests otherwise. The last column 
reports the implied change in probability of CEO turnover due to a change in the corresponding variable 









Intercept ? -1.64  
  (0.001)  
Performance − -2.22 -10.9% 
  (0.001)  
Performance×D_FamilyCEO + 2.07 10.7% 
  (0.001)  
Performance×D_NonFamily + 1.11 8.3% 
  (0.027)  
D_FamilyCEO − -1.39 -9.8% 
  (0.001)  
D_NonFamily − -0.84 -7.2% 
  (0.001)  
CEO_tenure − -0.02 -0.6% 
  (0.090)  
Size − -0.20 -2.5% 
  (0.001)  
N_firm + 0.32 4.1% 
  (0.001)  
    
Likelihood ratio  116.7  
(p-value)  (0.001)  
Additional tests    
-0.15 -0.2% Turnover-performance sensitivity for family CEO firms (α1+α1a) 
 (0.651)  
-1.11 -2.6% Turnover-performance sensitivity for non-family firms  (α1+α1b) 
 (0.001)  
0.96 2.4% Difference in sensitivity between family CEO  
and non-family firms (α1a-α1b) (0.028)  
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Table 6 Valuation differential across firm types 
 





DummiesYearDummiesIndustryVariablesControl                   
NonFamilyDFamilyCEODQ s'Tobin 210
δγβ
      (2) 
We report results for the poor performance period, other periods, and the full sample separately. The poor 
performance period refers to firm-years with market-adjusted returns falling into the bottom quartile of the 
sample distribution, and other periods include all other firm-years. The results for industry and year 
dummies are not reported for the sake of brevity. The full sample includes 2,734 firm-years in the period 
1996–1999. The sample size is smaller than that in Table 2 because financial and utility companies are 
excluded following prior research (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The p-values (in the parentheses) are 
based on one-sided tests for the coefficients on D_FamilyCEO and D_NonFamily during the poor 













Intercept 2.141 2.543 2.227 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_FamilyCEO -0.235 0.118 0.063 
 (0.006) (0.330) (0.504) 
D_NonFamily -0.151 -0.152 -0.138 
 (0.043) (0.191) (0.132) 
Size 0.019 -0.042 -0.007 
 (0.374) (0.122) (0.730) 
Growth 1.037 1.596 1.243 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Return volatility 0.256 -2.288 -1.155 
 (0.632) (0.014) (0.064) 
Leverage -0.785 -2.694 -2.143 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_Board Indep. -0.026 0.110 0.063 
 (0.857) (0.588) (0.684) 
Blockholding -0.006 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO equity comp. 0.003 0.008 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock returns 1.141 1.736 1.736 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Number of observations 684 2,050 2,734 
Adj. R2 0.389 0.479 0.490 
    
Additional tests:    
-0.084 0.270 0.201 Difference in Tobin’s Q between family CEO 
firms and non-family firms  (0.153) (0.001) (0.002) 
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Table 6 Valuation differential across firm types (Cont’d) 
 
Notes to Table 6: 
The variables are measured as follows: 
Tobin’s Q = the ratio of a firm’s market value of assets to its book value of assets at year-end; 
D_FamilyCEO = 1 for family firms with a member from the founding family as the CEO, and 0 otherwise; 
D_NonFamily = 1 for non-family firms, and 0 otherwise; 
Size = firm size, measured as log transformation of total assets (in millions); 
Growth = R&D/total assets; 
Return volatility = the standard deviation of monthly market-adjusted stock returns;  
Leverage = long-term debt/total assets; 
D_Board indep. = 1 if independent board members make up over 60% of the board and 0 otherwise; 
Blockholding  = percentage of outstanding shares held by blockholders other than the founding family; 
CEO equity comp. = the value of the CEO’s annual stock and option grants divided by total CEO pay; 
Stock return = annual market-adjusted stock return. 
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Table 7 Reconciliation with prior studies of family firm premium 
 
This table reports results that reconcile firm valuation findings reported in Table 6 with those documented 
in prior studies. Panel A focuses on the overall family firm value premium over non-family firms, and 
Panel B separately examines founder premium and descendant discount. For each panel, we report results 
for the full sample, the poor performance period, and other periods separately. The full sample includes 
2,734 firm-years in the period 1996–1999. The sample size is smaller than that in Table 2 because financial 
and utility companies are excluded, as in prior research (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The poor performance 
period refers to firm-years with market-adjusted returns falling into the bottom quartile of the sample 
distribution, and other periods include all other firm-years.  
 
Panel A Family firm premium over non-family firms 
 








   (3) 
D_FamilyFirm is 1 for family firms, and 0 otherwise. See Table 6 for the measurement of other variables. 
The results for industry and year dummies are not reported for the sake of brevity. The p-values (in the 











Intercept 2.092 2.012 2.384 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_FamilyFirm 0.184 -0.036 0.247 
 (0.002) (0.516) (0.002) 
Size -0.008 0.017 -0.042 
 (0.708) (0.440) (0.116) 
Growth 1.248 1.005 1.577 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Return volatility -1.129 0.154 -2.293 
 (0.070) (0.773) (0.013) 
Leverage -2.143 -0.788 -2.697 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_Board Indep. 0.063 -0.031 0.127 
 (0.686) (0.829) (0.530) 
Blockholding -0.010 -0.006 -0.012 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
CEO equity comp. 0.007 0.003 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock returns 1.737 1.153 1.777 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Number of observations 2,734 684 2,050 




Table 7 Reconciliation with prior studies of family firm premium (Cont’d)  
 
Panel B Founder CEO premium and descendant CEO discount over non-family firms 
 








  (4) 
D_FounderCEO (D_DescendantCEO, D_ProfessionalCEO) is 1 for family firms run by founders 
(descendants, professional CEOs), and 0 otherwise. See Table 6 for the measurement of other variables.  
The results for industry and year dummies are not reported for the sake of brevity. The p-values (in the 












Intercept 2.176 2.067 2.447 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_FounderCEO 0.279 -0.034 0.362 
 (0.001) (0.578) (0.001) 
D_DescendantCEO -0.166 -0.373 -0.063 
 (0.084) (0.002) (0.680) 
D_ProfessionalCEO 0.113 0.127 0.134 
 (0.217) (0.065) (0.249) 
Size -0.010 0.015 -0.042 
 (0.623) (0.483) (0.117) 
Growth 1.208 1.007 1.537 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Return volatility -1.323 0.135 -2.449 
 (0.034) (0.800) (0.008) 
Leverage -2.162 -0.789 -2.723 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_Board Indep. 0.014 -0.046 0.073 
 (0.930) (0.746) (0.720) 
Blockholding -0.010 -0.006 -0.012 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO equity comp. 0.007 0.003 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock returns 1.732 1.170 1.766 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Number of observations 2,734 684 2,050 
Adj. R2 0.493 0.396 0.483 
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Table 8 Valuation differential across firm types: Robustness check 
 
This table reports sensitivity tests of H3 and H4: valuation differentials across firm types after the poor 





DummiesYearDummiesIndustryVariablesControl                   
NonFamilyDFamilyCEODQ s'Tobin 210
δγβ
      (2) 
See Table 6 for variable measurement. The poor performance period refers to firm-years with market-
adjusted returns (industry-adjusted return on assets) falling into the bottom quartile of the sample 
distribution in Columns (1) (Column (2)). In Column (1), we use lagged firm-type dummies, rather than the 
firm-type dummies defined for the same year as Tobin’s Q. In all regressions, we include industry and year 
dummies; for the sake of brevity, the results for these dummies are not reported. The p-values (in the 
parentheses) are based on one-sided tests for the coefficients on D_FamilyCEO and D_NonFamily, which 




Using lagged firm-type dummies 
(2) 
Using ROA to define the poor 
performance period 
Intercept 1.886 1.752 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
D_FamilyCEO -0.199 -0.235 
 (0.018) (0.004) 
D_NonFamily -0.120 -0.151 
 (0.045) (0.042) 
Size 0.022 0.013 
 (0.307) (0.523) 
Growth 0.852 3.268 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Return volatility 0.062 -0.268 
 (0.906) (0.578) 
Leverage -0.565 -0.489 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
D_Board Indep. -0.052 -0.062 
 (0.713) (0.656) 
Blockholding -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.001) 
CEO equity comp. 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock return 1.061 0.255 
 (0.001) (0.368) 
 
Number of observations 596 684 
Adj. R2 0.405 0.570 
 
 
 
 
